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  Abstract  
In Korea, trade with Japan has had a deficit since the normalization of Japan-Korea 
diplomatic relations in 1965. Korea’s trade balance with Japan has remained in 
deficit since then, although Korean companies have become bigger compared to 
Japanese companies. My hypothesis is that the problem has been caused because 
Korea introduced technologies from Japan. However, in recent years Korean 
companies could not introduce technologies through technical cooperation with 
Japan like in the 1990s. In addition, the Korean government seemed to encourage 
domestic production for import substitution. Nevertheless, the deficit has continued. I 
thought it necessary to check my hypothesis in order to discover whether or not it 
was persuasive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) is a semigovernmental, 
nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute, founded in 1958. The Institute 
merged with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) on July 1, 1998.  
The Institute conducts basic and comprehensive studies on economic and 
related affairs in all developing countries and regions, including Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).  Publication does 
not imply endorsement by the Institute of Developing Economies of any of the views 
expressed within. 
 
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (IDE), JETRO 
3-2-2, WAKABA, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI 
CHIBA 261-8545, JAPAN 
 
©20XX by Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO 
No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the 
IDE-JETRO. 
 1 
 
An export strategy and technology networks in the 
Republic of Korea 
 
Junko MIZUNO 
Institute of Developing Economies 
Executive Senior Research Fellow 
Inter-Disciplinary Studies Center 
12 Feb., 2013. 
 
Preface 
In Korea, trade with Japan has had a deficit since the normalization of Japan-Korea 
diplomatic relations in 1965 (see figure 1). 
"Since the medium- and small-sized enterprises in Korea were weak, Korea should 
have imported parts and material from Japanese medium- and small-sized enterprises. 
Because Japan did not give technologies to Korea, Korea has had a trade deficit". For 
many years, the Korean government has strongly insisted during Japanese-Korean 
diplomatic negotiations that this is so and it has complained about the lack of 
technology transfers. 
In view of such a history and to solve Korea’s trade deficit with Japan, both the 
Japanese and the Korean governments established the Japan-Korea Industrial 
Technology Co-Operation Foundation for the purpose of transferring technologies to 
Korea from Japan’s medium- and small-sized enterprises with investments from both 
governments in 1992.  
Korea’s trade balance with Japan has remained in deficit since then, although 
Korean companies have become bigger compared to Japanese companies. 
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Since the normalization of Japan-Korea relations, during diplomatic negotiations 
the government of Korea has insisted that Japan should bear the responsibility for 
Korea’s trade deficit, and the Korean government has invited Japanese medium- and 
small-sized enterprises to give technologies to Korea. 
In the Japan-Korea FTA negotiations and the negotiations over the Japan, China 
and Korea FTA, the government of Korea has strongly insisted that "the solution to 
Korea’s trade deficit with Japan was a premise for the conclusion of an FTA with 
Japan". 
 
Fig.１　Change of the Korean trade deficit to Japan
（Source） Korea Central Bank
(100mil.USD）
 
 
 
 
（億ド ）
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Because this issue has not been solved for 40 years, we must consider other possible 
reasons for the problem. In the present situation, where Korea’s conglomerates are 
looking down on the deficits of Japanese companies as the former increase their sales, 
it is common to think that this analysis of the cause for the deficit which has lasted 
more than 40 years may have been mistaken and that it might not be the case that 
"because Japan does not transfer technologies to Korea, Korean medium- and 
small-sized businesses are weak and must import parts and material from Japanese 
medium- and small-sized producers.” 
My hypothesis is that the problem has been caused because Korea introduced 
technologies from Japan. However, in recent years Korean companies could not 
introduce technologies through technical cooperation with Japan like in the 1990s. In 
addition, the Korean government seemed to encourage domestic production for import 
substitution. Nevertheless, the deficit has continued. I thought it necessary to check 
my hypothesis in order to discover whether or not it was persuasive. 
 
1. The procedure and results of the verification 
 
I therefore decided to examine the hypothesis afresh and see whether the Korean 
government’s claim was rational. 
The procedures of the verification are as follows. First, a study team tried to discover 
the names of the items called "parts, material" that the Korean government said were 
the cause of the deficit. On investigation, the "parts, material" that the Korean 
government was talking about were like the black box of a flight recorder in that we 
could not find precise details about the contents. The system behind the trade balance 
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was such that an outsider could not obtain the information we needed. Therefore, we 
used the UN Com Trade’s statistics, where the government of every country, including 
Korea, provides its trade statistics to the United Nations. These statistics are then 
shown on the homepage of the United Nations. The study team decided to use them to 
check the names of the commodities imported from Japan. On investigation, 100 
high-ranking items (for the classification standard of two digit classifications) that 
Korea imported from Japan accounted for approximately 60% of imports from Japan. I 
inspected these to see whether they were products produced by Japanese medium- and 
small-sized businesses. I then excluded items like steel sheets or semiconductors, 
because these were obviously the products of big companies and not produced by the 
medium- and small-sized businesses that the Korean government was complaining 
about. Third, for the other imported items, which were not definitely the products of 
big companies, I checked to see if the products were produced by medium- and 
small-sized businesses. Fourth, I considered why the items had been imported from 
Japan. As a result, the following things became clear. 
Firstly, according to the United Nations Com Trade, it became clear that Korea 
imports capital goods and industrial supplies from Japan, and the ratio was one-third 
of the deficit for capital goods imports and two-thirds for industrial supplies. Even up 
to this year, this pattern has roughly stayed the same. Figure 2 shows Korean imports 
from Japan and the trade balance with Japan in 2009. When the Korean government 
says "parts, material", in Korean they actually mean industrial supplies and capital 
goods. However, in Japanese, the words "parts, material" do not include capital goods. 
However, the person in charge of the Korean government calls both machine tools, 
which are representative of factory machinery, and semiconductor production 
equipment "parts" and feels no sense of incongruity when doing this. In Japan and 
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Korea, it became clear that the content of what was being talked about for each party 
was very different when the two countries were discussing the term "parts, material". 
Japan and Korea negotiated an "understanding" without recognizing that there was 
such a difference between the governments in their use of the term "parts, material", 
and without realizing that there was such a misunderstanding. 
Figure 2： Korean trade and the balance with Japan by goods (2009) 
 
 (Source) UN Com Trade 
 
Secondly, checking the Japanese companies that produced the 100 high-ranking 
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imports from Japan, surprisingly, they are all from big companies, not the medium- 
and small-sized businesses which the Korean government insisted were the problem. 
There is a law which defines medium- and small-sized businesses in Korea as in Japan. 
The name of the law is called the "Fundamental Law of Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises’ Enforcement Order". By law, as for the manufacturing industry, a 
medium- or small-sized business is defined as one that has "less than 300 employees as 
a general rule or capital of 8 billion won (approximately 1 billion yen or less)." However, 
the image of the general medium- and small-sized business in Korea really has nothing 
to do with the legal definition. Generally, a Korean often calls most companies, except 
some famous huge companies, medium- or small-sized businesses. Similarly, because 
Koreans generally only know the famous, big Japanese companies like Toyota or 
Panasonic, they call almost all Japanese companies "a medium and small-sized 
business". For example, when the Korean government wants to invite a Japanese 
"medium and small-sized business" to Korea, the company which the Korean 
government wants to invite is often actually a large company. There is a difference in 
Japanese-Korean understanding here. 
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Table 1:　Korean import commodities and amounts from Japan
Amount of import (million USD)
ＨS code  name of commodities 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009
 7208
Flat-rolled products of iron or
non-alloy steel,
3,121 4,528 3,741 5.55 7.43 7.57
 3920
Other plates, sheets, film, foil and
strip, of plastics,
1,536 1,817 2,260 2.73 2.98 4.57
 8542
Electronic integrated circuits and
microassemblies
3,853 3,139 2,210 6.85 5.15 4.47
 8486
Machines and apparatus of a kind
used solely or principally for the
manufacture of semiconductor
boules or wafers, semiconductor
devices, electronic integrated
circuits or flat panel displays;
2,882 3,472 1,664 5.12 5.7 3.37
 2902 Cyclic hydrocarbons 1,308 1,409 1,262 2.33 2.31 2.55
 7204
Ferrous waste or scrap, ingots or
iron or steel
1,384 1,504 1,208 2.46 2.47 2.44
 7207
Semi-finished products of iron or
non-alloy steel
1,095 1,495 1,204 1.95 2.45 2.44
 9001
Optical fibres, lenses, mirrors,
prisms, etc
998 1,063 1,136 1.77 1.74 2.3
 3824 Prepr binder for foundry 863 918 1,062 1.53 1.51 2.15
 7004 Drawn or blown glass, in sheets 721 948 1,008 1.28 1.56 2.04
 8541
Diodes, transistors, semi-
conductors, etc
1,014 1,196 1,008 1.8 1.96 2.04
 8708
Parts and accessories for motor
vehicles
1,021 1,107 893 1.82 1.82 1.81
 8479
Machines nes having individual
functions
887 985 748 1.58 1.62 1.51
 3818
Chemical element/compound
wafers doped for electronics
1,487 1,292 600 2.64 2.12 1.21
 8901
Passenger and goods transport
ships, boats
993 1,150 580 1.77 1.89 1.17
 8517
Electric apparatus for line
telephony, telegraphy
416 545 524 0.74 0.9 1.06
 8536 Electrical switches, connectors, 548 576 503 0.97 0.94 1.02
 2707
Coal-tar distillation products
including oils
594 746 422 1.06 1.22 0.85
 2901 Acyclic hydrocarbons 400 437 402 0.71 0.72 0.81
 8703
Motor vehicles for transport of
persons (except buses)
583 650 395 1.04 1.07 0.8
 8538
Parts for electrical switches,
protectors, connectors
246 400 391 0.44 0.66 0.79
 8443 Printing and ancillary machinery 545 548 388 0.97 0.9 0.79
 7219
Rolled stainless steel sheet,
width > 600mm
463 537 382 0.82 0.88 0.77
 7304 408 461 361 0.73 0.76 0.73
 7216
Angles, shapes and sections of
iron or non-alloy steel
401 782 359 0.71 1.28 0.73
 2710
Oils petroleum, bituminous,
distillates, except crude
315 521 347 0.56 0.85 0.7
Total of 26 commodities 28,082 32,227 25,058 ― ― ―
Ratio of 26 commodities to the
import total sum from Japan
56,250 60,956 49,428 49.9 52.9 50.7
参考 The export total sum to Japan 26,370 28,252 21,771 ― ― ―
The ratio of 26 commodities to
trade deficit with Japan
29,880 32,704 27,657 94 98.5 90.6
(Source) The World Trade Atlas original data are Korean entry statistics
Ratio to the import total sum
from Japan (%)
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  Thirdly, which commodities did Korea import from Japan? We also decided to check 
the reason why Korea imported these goods. Therefore, we decided to get the names of 
the commodities imported by Korea from Japan using the UN Com Trade statistics. We 
picked trade items by sub-classification from 1990. The classification used is the HS 
(Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System) code, which is the 
classification for all the entries in the statistics. There is a classification (four digits), a 
sub-classification (six digits) within a macro-taxonomy (two digits). In the case of 
Korea, there is a detailed classification of ten digits. Looking at the two-digit 
classification of HS, there are many HS72 "steel product", HS84 "instrumentation and 
parts", HS85 "electric apparatus and parts" among the 26 highest ranking imports 
from Japan. Of these, HS72 "steel product" is a product from big companies such as 
Nippon Steel as described above and is not the product of a medium- or small-sized 
business, so the study team excluded it from their objects for detailed analysis. When 
we look at the imported commodities from Japan in detail, using the ten-digit 
classification, we found commodities, such as semiconductor devices, LCD (Liquid 
Crystal Display) panels and products to produce mobile phones. In other words, 
regarding the products that Korea imported from Japan, it was clear that there were 
many things which large, Korean enterprises  imported to produce the main exports 
of Korea. 
Therefore the study team decided to check whether the commodities that Korea 
imported from Japan in order to produce semiconductors, LCD panels and mobile 
phones were really the products of Japanese medium- and small-sized businesses. In 
addition, the study team also inspected the introduction of new technologies, the 
relations between the procurement of industrial supplies and capital goods, and the 
situation with regards to localization in these three Korean industries. I decided to 
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inspect a hypothesis that suggests the trade deficit is the result of the introduction of 
imports of new technologies from Japan. 
 
2. The introduction of new technology-producing imports 
 
 Korea has introduced technologies from Japan, and it is indisputable that Korea has 
produced products using these technologies and has exported these products, which 
has made Korea grow. Information about the introduction of these technologies from 
Japan can be understood from "The technologies introduction contract, present 
situation in '62 - '95", which was published by the Korea Industrial Technology 
Association until 1995. The situation is not clear after 1995 because we could get no 
information for after that year. According to Figure 3, in the electronics and electrical 
equipment industry, the top country of origin for the introduction of new technologies 
to Korea was Japan before 1990. However, the United States rose to the top position 
with respect to new technologies exports after that. Because the Japanese-Korean 
technological gap was reduced around the 1990s, Japanese companies began to refuse 
to transfer technology to Korea. This is the reason why these numbers for the 
electronics and electrical equipment industry fell. 
When competition began in the Japanese-Korean electronics and electrical 
equipment industry, the import of technologies from Japan became difficult. In those 
days, the number of Japanese engineers being headhunted away from Japanese 
electronics and electrical equipment companies by Korean companies began to increase. 
The number of Japanese engineers in Korean companies reached a peak in 1997 when 
an economic crisis occurred and the number suddenly declined, but it increased again 
afterwards. 
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Technological diffusion from Japan to Korea varies from a form of direct investment 
and technical cooperation to the headhunting of Japanese engineers. If either form 
introduces a technology, Korea must supply capital goods and industrial supplies to 
produce products using these technologies and enter the technology network of the 
technology exporting company. When developing countries introduce a technology from 
a developed country and produce a product, they must import capital goods and 
Fig. 3 Number of technologies introduced from Japan and the 
USA in the electronics and electrical equipment industry in Korea 
 
(Source) Korea Industrial Technology Association [1995] "The technologies 
introduction contract, present situation in '62 - '95", pp.509-725. 
 
industrial supplies to fill any technology gaps. Figure 4 shows that Korea produces 
product using technologies introduced from Japan, and it imports capital goods and  
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Fig.4 Relations of the production change of the Korean color
television and LCD panel and the procurement of industrial
supplies and capital goods
CTV production
(Mil. unit)
Mil. units
LCD panel  production 
(Bil. USD) Bil.USD
 
                             
(Source) Junko Mizuno [2010] p.22。 
①In the set-up period, many industrial supplies and capital goods are imported from Japan. 
②Import substitution begins. The industrial supplies and capital goods imported from Japan begin 
to decrease. 
③When offshore production begins, imports of industrial supplies and capital goods from Japan 
decreases . 
In order to inspect the above hypothesis, I will look below at procurement and technology transfers  
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regarding semiconductors, LCD panels, and mobile phones. 
industrial supplies for the production required at the time of set-up, but the figure 
also shows that, at the second stage, if the Korean company can get enough profit from 
their production because the market is big enough to make fresh investments, import 
substitution begins. The production units of color televisions hit their peak in 1989, but 
they had imported many industrial supplies and capital goods from 1980 through 1984 
from Japan during the period needed to set up production. Import substitution began 
afterwards because there was enough volume and profits for Korean companies to be 
able to invest the huge amounts of money needed to produce the goods they needed to 
substitute for their imports. Then the second period started. However, because Korea 
introduced other technologies again when the production of color televisions began to 
decrease, the same process was repeated, and imports from Japan increased. 
 
3. Technologies introduction in the semiconductor industry in Korea and imports 
from Japan 
 
Technologies for semiconductor production in Korea entered from the United States 
and Japan. Processing technologies were diffused from Japan but production 
technologies came from the United States. Mitarai’s analysis [2011a] shows that the 
rate of localization for the production of the semiconductor materials is over 50%, 
which marks considerable progress in comparison with the figure of around 20% for 
the rate of localization for producing the devices in 2009. In particular, the rates of 
localization for advanced production, such as for photomasks, special gases, process 
chemicals and metals, are 70-95%, a high value. On the other hand, regarding silicon 
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wafers and CMP slurry, the rate of localization is around 30%, the photoresist is at a 
level of more than 50%. Korean companies import silicon wafers, for which there is the 
biggest demand, from big companies such as SUMCO CORP. (40%), Shin-Etsu 
Chemical Co. Ltd (25%), LG Siltron (20%), and Siltronic Samsung Wafer Pte. Ltd. 
(15%). These companies are, in fact, big companies; they are not medium- or 
small-sized businesses. The only local company is LG Siltron, the others are Japanese 
exporters (SUMCO CORP. and Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd), with Siltronic Samsung 
Wafer Pte. Ltd. operating under joint management in Singapore. 
Looking at semiconductor production in Korea, together with domestic industrial 
supplies and imported industrial supplies, Korea increased its imports from Japan to 
about 200-250 billion Japanese yen in the mid-2000s from 100-150 billion Japanese 
yen in the early 2000s, but, affected by the fall in semiconductor production from 2009 
to 2010, imports decreased to 180 -170 billion Japanese yen. The imports depended on 
the amount of production. 
This was the same with respect to the United States with the figures there being 
35% (down from 40% in 2006) and Japan 28% (down from 35% in 2006), but for Europe 
it was 32% (up from 24%), and Taiwan 5% (up from 2%), according to information from 
Korea’s KSIA on the imports of semiconductor production devices in 2009. Japanese 
volumes fell together with the United States, and instead Europe and Taiwan took 
their place, because their prices were more competitive. From the data on the Japanese 
side regarding this situation, exports to Korea of Japanese semiconductor production 
devices totaled from 50 billion yen to 140 billion yen around 2000, increased to 200 
billion yen in the mid-2000s and reached a peak at approximately 270 billion yen in 
2007. Although the exchange rates, the classification of the statistics and the years are 
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slightly different, a comparison of the data between 2006 and 2009 supports the 
information from the KSIA. 
Import substitution for the imported capital goods and industrial supplies was 
gradually realized, but Korea imports capital goods and industrial supplies 
strategically, since the manufacture of such products is not sufficiently profitable in 
Korea, even though Korea has the technology necessary to engage in such 
manufacturing if it so wished. Therefore, the expansion of the semiconductor 
production of Korean companies became the reason for the increase in the imports of 
industrial supplies and production devices, and caused the trade deficit with Japan. 
 
4. Technology introduction in the LCD panel industry in Korea and imports from 
Japan 
 
Because the technology of LCD panels was developed in Japan, the technology was 
diffused from Japan. Korean companies asked for technological cooperation regarding 
LCD panels from Japan because they predicted that the cathode-ray tube market 
would decline and that LCD panels and plasma display panels would replace 
cathode-ray tubes in the future. But the Japanese companies refused. Therefore, after 
the 1990s, Korean companies began to catch up by headhunting Japanese engineers 
and importing capital goods and production supplies. According to Mitarai [2011b], the 
rate of localization reached around 60% with regard to the purchase of industrial 
supplies, then it reached 80% at the end of 2009, if one adds the local production of 
Japanese companies in Korea. Although the dependence on Japan for raw materials is 
still sizeable, it is necessary to regard this in terms of investment costs and benefits. 
As for the production materials required for LCDs, national policy has judged this to be 
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easier than is the case for semiconductor production devices, so domestic production 
has progressed and dependence on Japan has decreased. 
 
5. Technology introduction in the mobile phone industry and imports from Japan 
 
Korea did well in technological development and technology transfers in terms of 
practical digital mobile phones under the national project system, according to 
QUALCOMM Incorporated of the USA, which was looking for a joint development 
partner in the early 1990s. In Japan, the NTT group pushed for practical use with an 
original method called the PDC (Personal Digital Cellular), but the plan to go global 
did not turn out well, for various reasons. Because of this, technological relations in the 
mobile phone sector between Japan and Korea are weak. There is not much of a 
relationship in basic technologies regarding Korean mobile phones. As a result, in 
mobile phone production, Korean companies depend more on the USA than on Japan. 
According to Mitarai [2011c], 80-90 % of displays, cameras, batteries, printed circuit 
boards, and housing use locally made products. On the other hand, almost all of the 
baseband processors, which constitute the basic technology in mobile phones, come 
from imports from Europe and the USA. The percentage of domestic production is high 
for semiconductor memory. The localization of semiconductors and LSIs, which are 
used in the application processors that perform internet correspondence and 
multimedia processing, has already started with Samsung Electron on the expectation 
of growing demand due to the spread of smart phones in the near future. Very 
important elements, such as displays, cameras and batteries, which were first almost 
entirely imported from Japan, are going to be localized on the basis of modules. It is 
just with regard to matrix systems, such as the high frequency parts of the RF system, 
the wireless interface systems, and the sensors or tip parts that Korea still strongly 
depends on Japan. Of course, this dependence on Japan is strengthened with the 
high-tech parts connected to the new mobile phones like the smart phone to begin with, 
but domestic production will soon start, and dependence on Japan will be reduced. The 
Japanese exporters here are big companies and not medium- and small-sized 
businesses. 
 
Conclusion 
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Korea intended to catch up with Japan and overtake it, and it selected 
semiconductors and LCD panels for strategic reasons and nurtured these sectors as 
export industries. As a result, this strategy forces Korea to participate in Japanese 
technology networks and depend on Japan. This is shown to be the cause of the deficit.   
On the other hand, in the case of the mobile phone industry, as for the issue of 
dependence on Japan, in comparison with semiconductors and LCD panels, Korea’s 
dependency is relatively light, because the original technology came from the USA. 
Herein above, we saw that the reason why the Korean trade deficit with Japan has 
been a big issue for many years is that Korean companies have chosen their 
technologies from among Japan’s main export products strategically. This goes for 
products like color televisions, VCRs, semiconductors, and LCD panels, and they have 
imported capital goods and industrial supplies from Japan in order to invest in and 
produce the same products on a large scale so as to take a large share of the global 
market in the short term. Developing countries can have the same industries as 
developed countries, but they cannot avoid importing industrial supplies and capital 
goods to fill a technological gap which they cannot fill with goods produced 
domestically. In addition, if a developing country cannot secure enough demand to 
make it worth investing in the production of goods that would fill such a technological 
gap, they will import existing industrial supplies and capital goods from a developed 
country like Japan, because it is more profitable to do this than make the investment 
required to do otherwise. 
Generally, it may be said that the best course to solve the deficit with Japan is to 
develop product in Korea, but there is no guarantee that this would be a business 
model that would maximize profits. Also, there has been a strong tendency in recent 
years in Korea to think that original development in Korea is a waste of time. In theory, 
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there are other ways to solve the trade deficit with Japan. For example, Korea could 
increase its exports to Japan, or Korean companies could enter Japan. Korea holds the 
key to solving their trade deficit with Japan. 
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